Point of no return? American relations with Syria
Rime Allaf, November 2004
President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.
Since the invasion of Iraq, American-Syrian relations have worsened drastically; harsh Syrian rhetoric was countered by vehement American accusations of assistance to Iraqi insurgents. Washington slapped sanctions on Damascus for supporting "terrorism," and even rashly allowed Israel to strike targets within Syria, after thirty years of relative calm. Has Syria properly handled unreasonable American-Israeli pressure? Or has it ultimately helped achieve its own isolation by alienating powerful friends with risky meddling in Lebanon?
Describing US-Syrian relations as tepid is an understatement in the best of times, and even a misstatement when the volatile relationship seems to reach the point of no return.
Things were much more pleasant in the nineties, a decade most Syrians remember rather fondly. Having chosen to oppose Iraq - while the world mostly supported it - after it launched an eight-year war on Iran, embroiled in a difficult Lebanese civil war and fighting an internal Islamic insurgency, Syria had lived the eighties like a recluse, its economy crumbling and its people suffocating.
But when thousands of Syrian troops helped liberate Kuwait from Saddam Hussein's grip in 1991, it instantly attracted Western praise. Recognizing Syria's importance in the region and giving it carte blanche to deal with Lebanon's turmoil, President George Bush senior kept the promise he had made to President Hafez Assad and to other Arab leaders; the US would sponsor the Arab-Israeli peace process. The negotiations fizzled out during President Bill Clinton's last days in office, but the Syrian-American communication line at least remained open.
Deteriorating
Goodwill diminished significantly in 2000, when the two countries' new presidents inherited a deteriorating situation from their predecessors. Israel's violent response to the Palestinian Intifada, officially ending the peace talks, put Israel's loudest critics at the top of the Bush administration's expanding list of enemies. Washington's active peddling of the Syria Accountability Act, which threatened sanctions for Syria's alleged support of terrorism and its presence in Lebanon, was a forewarning of things to come, a drift Syria ignored at its own peril. Right from the beginning, the new Bush administration was uncompromising and inexplicably on the offensive, making dialogue difficult.
When Bush declared war on "terror" after September 11, Syria freely offered extensive intelligence on a number of Islamist groups, calculating this would buy it leverage on other fronts. This was to be one of several superficial and erroneous Syrian analyses of American posture: Washington, expecting such cooperation as its rightful due, never considered it a favour. Nor was the Bush administration about to make exceptions in its vast catalogue of "terrorist" groups: with assiduous Israeli lobbying, Syria's backing of Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, a central pillar in its support for a common Arab cause, would no longer be tolerated by Washington.
Syria had trouble adapting to this new global situation, finding itself increasingly isolated and eventually alienating even those powers, like France, which had been willing to argue its case. A two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council proved unproductive: Syria did not cultivate relations with key powers, nor recover the status it had enjoyed in the nineties. Tellingly, Syria even failed to promote a discussion on a draft resolution condemning Israel's violation of its sovereignty in a controversial strike - a unique situation for a member of the Security Council.
With its recent unwise meddling in Lebanon, Syria given itself little room for movement. Had it reflected along the way, it might have realized that intelligent manoeuvring - rather than blind defiance - was advisable to circumvent the quick temper of an American administration determined to impose new designs on the Middle East. Had it played its cards better with the invasion of Iraq, it might have prevented America's wrath from descending so forcefully. And had it nurtured the goodwill of the European Union, it might have avoided the awkward squabble over the Association Agreement.
Crescendo of rhetoric
Like most Arab regimes, Syria was torn between long-standing hatred of the Iraqi regime - although relations had somewhat warmed in recent years - and a lingering fear that America could ultimately succeed in improving Iraq, triggering a dreaded "regime change" domino effect on neighbouring countries. Syria boldly opposed the invasion, aligning itself with America's European challengers, and even moving closer to Turkey as both countries attempted to minimize potential consequences - not least vis-à-vis the dormant Kurdish issue both faced.
In November 2002, Syria voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1441 giving Saddam Hussein his ultimatum, arguing, like France and Russia, that this in no way approved resorting to force. Simultaneously, it adopted a forceful tone with the US: as American and British tanks swept across the Iraqi desert, Syria declared it stood "with the Iraqi people" and wished for the defeat of the invaders. America's furious response was immediate, accusing Syria of smuggling night-vision goggles to the Iraq regime and allowing insurgents to infiltrate the porous Syrian-Iraqi border.
The ambiguities of Syria's position became increasingly marked; in May 2003, as the Security Council voted on UNSC Resolution 1483 sanctifying the occupation of Iraq, Syria "missed" the session but later claimed it would have supported it had it not been for the seven-hour difference between New York and Damascus, and for the time diplomats needed to confer with the foreign ministry.
But in October 2003, days after the Bush administration defended an Israeli attack on Syrian soil, Syria quietly voted for UNSC Resolution 1511 on Iraq, bowing to the US and trying to limit further damage.
The strident rhetoric and counter-rhetoric gradually softened, but the situation actually continued to worsen. While the pro-Israeli lobby tirelessly talked about Syria as a menace, no pro-Syrian counterpart existed; in November 2003, the US Congress overwhelmingly passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SALSA).
This was undoubtedly pushed by Israel, but it was Syria's official stance on Iraq which convinced Bush to allow its ratification. And it was also the continuing discord on Iraq which pushed him to impose minor sanctions in May 2004, reserving heavier penalties for a late date.
Pragmatism prevails
Despite its public opposition to Iraq's occupation, Syria has in fact been working to establish a relationship with its new rulers - Iraqi and American - anxious to re-open the Kirkuk-Banyas oil pipeline closed by Washington, and to resume normal trade between the two countries.
Syria's attitude towards the Iraqi Governing Council (and the subsequent Interim Government) wavered between total dismissal as an illegitimate body, and cautious welcome as one to be judged by its actions. Pragmatism prevailed, and Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi received a red carpet treatment when he visited Damascus this summer. Religious, ethnic and tribal Iraqi factions, and government members, are also regularly welcomed in Syria.
The US had accused Syria of harbouring Saddam's henchmen and of retaining sizeable Iraqi funds, amongst other complaints. After most members of the former Iraqi regime had been caught or killed, and with Syria's readiness to discuss financial issues, America's main gripe focused on its alleged reluctance to restrain a flow of militants eager to join the Iraqi resistance. For long, Syria argued that it could not control such a long border single-handedly and needed American help, a scenario the US was disinclined to entertain until recently. An agreement was finally reached in September to hold joint control over the border, a "rather positive development" for Secretary of State Colin Powell.
From Syria's perspective, apart from the obligatory Arabist rhetoric (if only for appearances' sake), there is not much more it could have done to alleviate American pressure, especially as the US continues to blame foreign elements for the quagmire in Iraq, or even for hiding Saddam's missing WMDs, which some American officials claim - absurdly - are in Syria.
Syria's problems with the US are multi-faceted, and even a softening of rhetoric on Iraq from both sides has no positive effect on the major hurdle of unconditional American support for Israel.
Impasse
Syria was unpleasantly surprised by its exclusion from the Roadmap, pushed by the US and unveiled on April 30, 2003 by the Quartet (US, EU, UN and Russia), especially after Arab League members had unanimously adopted the Arab Peace Initiative a year earlier.
After the clash on Iraq, the Bush administration rashly marginalized Syria, discounting its pivotal role in the conflict and ignoring its legitimate demands for the return of the Golan Heights, seized by Israel in 1967. At the very least, Syria expected a tacit push towards renewed talks, but the Roadmap addressed only the Palestinian-Israeli track.
Communication had broken down as the Intifada grew after Ariel Sharon's election. As he insisted (groundlessly) that suicide attacks in Israel were planned by Palestinian groups in Syria, the US pressured for the closure of Hamas and Islamic Jihad's Damascus bureaus, which Syria maintained were mere media offices. In May 2003, State Department officials confirmed they had effectively been closed.
Nevertheless, in a provocation the White House had clearly sanctioned, Israel bombed an alleged training camp in October 2003, striking within Syria for the first time in nearly thirty years. After the US immediately endorsed "Israel's right to self-defence," Syria could only meekly reserve its right to retaliate.
And yet, Damascus remained determined to revive peace talks with Israel. Successive statements from various members of the Syrian government, including the president, repeatedly called for a resumption of negotiations. Some even hinted that Syria might be willing to start negotiations from scratch, rather than picking up logically where they had stalled.
But with Bush's indifference and Sharon's admitted rebuttal of Syrian overtures, peace talks are clearly not on the agenda. In September, to further emphasize the stalemate and completely dismiss Syrian ambitions, Israel assassinated a Palestinian militant in Damascus, demonstrating it was capable of setting car bombs even in the heart of the Syrian capital.
Patience wears thin
In these circumstances, Syria hoped good relations with the European Union would minimize American-Israeli pressure. After years of stalling and eluding EU demands for political and economic reform, even blaming the delay on regional instability (to the extreme frustration of a promising reformist civil society), Syria began to pursue the Association Agreement already signed by other Mediterranean countries. However, it hadn't expected an additional WMD-inspection clause, which pre-September 11 signatories had escaped. Syria nevertheless felt it shouldn't be solely targeted, especially when it is believed that Israel was in possession of over two hundred nuclear warheads.
Syrian officials tried to secure an agreement before the US imposed SALSA's sanctions, hoping the EU would not face American pressure to do likewise. But disagreements remained on several fronts: Germany, nurturing its complex relationship with Israel, the Netherlands, objecting to Syria's human rights records, and Britain, weary of Syria's position on Iraq, insisted on tougher terms. Moreover, most of the EU's newest members seemed rather inclined to follow American reasoning on such matters.
Having diligently encouraged Syria to improve its institutions, even France's patience with its slow, artificial pace of reform was wearing thin. When Syria was finally left with no option but to accept the offending WMD clause, as luck would have it, France was now the one baulking.
Misjudged meddling
Seasoned Middle East analysts have had trouble understanding what exactly the Syrian government was thinking in September when it imposed an unpopular - and unconstitutional - extension to the president's term in Lebanon, despite urgent warnings from numerous parties, and despite the presence of several equally pliable alternatives to incumbent
President Emile Lahoud. Most observers ventured that Syria pulled out the one card it still held, as a potent reminder of its unavoidable role in the region; others pointed to internal struggles within a regime unable to reach a unified position.
Whatever its logic, Syria had obviously not assessed reactions correctly; it was stunned by France's co-sponsoring (with the US) of UNSC Resolution 1559, demanding a retreat of foreign forces from Lebanon, and an end to interference in its political affairs.
Unsurprisingly, Syria reacted, officially hailing the resolution as a "victory" because it failed to mention it by name. However, the Gulf Cooperation Council, followed by Jordan, urged Syria to accept its terms, and other Arab countries advised it to rethink its strategy. Given Arab governments' usual reluctance to interfere with each other, this is an unprecedented situation which may persuade Syria to reconsider its position.
Confusion
The limited redeployment of Syrian troops in Lebanon so soon after these warnings indicates that Syria, for all its heroics, realizes it has gone too far and that its actions backfired. Sidelined, its risky tactics followed no clear strategy, all the more reason why the world should be listening to Syria's grievances - most of which are perfectly legitimate.
True, the Syrian government has failed to engage allies and rivals alike, lacking access to the communication channels where media-savvy and politically-adept envoys could make a convincing case. For all their competence in non-diplomatic fields, Syria's new ambassadors can neither shift public opinions nor lobby politicians, and may present weak positions only too well.
Official Syrian rhetoric is often more bellicose than Syria's actual position would suggest; it needs fine tuning to complement Syria's rightful position as a necessary partner in the Middle East. Strategies must also be tailored to the realities of a post-September 11, and post-Iraq world, dismissing counter-productive stances in favour of progress on more urging matters.
But Syria's confusion is not unique, nor entirely self-made. Even expert international strategists have struggled to find common ground with an American administration that is unashamedly and explicitly belligerent in its dealings with big powers, let alone with countries it considers insignificant. For the US to achieve stability in the Middle East and greater cooperation on its global policies, it must accommodate other nations' reasonable demands, especially when these are backed by international law. The adage that no peace is possible without Syria still holds, especially while Syrian land remains under Israeli occupation. No American administration should ignore that.
The US can easily attain a much more constructive relationship with Syria, merely by dropping its big stick and talking, rather than bullying. In its own, distinct way, this is perhaps exactly what Syria has been trying to achieve. It is high time both realized that unjustified pressure neither wins friends nor influences people.
From the November issue of The World Today, the publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).
