Peace talks: means to an end or end in itself?
May 4, 2007
President Bush inaugurating the Madrid Peace Conference, October 30, 1991.
What a difference a few days can make! I was asked ages ago to write a piece on Syria for the leading Swiss newspaper (German speaking part, based in Zürich), Tages Anzeiger; I finally sent it last week, and it was published this morning.
Of course, as luck would have it, the American Secretary of State and the Syrian Foreign Minister couldn’t wait a few days more to meet, they simply had to do it yesterday. (More on that soon, of course.) Nevertheless, the meeting will not change much, and my essential argument is about whether the regime wants just to talk, or wants a peace treaty. I think it can live with both, but would actually gain a lot with the latter.
In any case, here is the English version; anyone interested in the German version should request it and I’ll gladly sent it (no link as it’s on a subscriber-only part online).
Basking in the limelight
Syrians are accustomed to seeing negative portrayals of their country in Western media, but the unprecedented levels of criticism following the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime managed to worry even the regime for some time. Would Syria’s strong denouncement of the Iraq fiasco encourage the Bush administration to seek a new confrontation and change two regimes for the price of one?
No sooner had the ensuing quagmire in Iraq begun to reassure the Syrians of their relative safety than a new, even harder situation arose with the spectacular assassination of Rafik Hariri in Beirut, at a time when some 14,000 Syrian troops and unknown numbers of Syrian intelligence officers still controlled Lebanon. Anti-Syrian sentiment was so high amongst Western leaders that it even reunited the US and France (which had been at drastically opposing poles on Iraq) into a joint foreign Levant policy, beginning with UN Security Council Resolution 1559 when Syria enforced an unconstitutional extension to its Lebanese ally’s presidential term.
Thus, when Syrian troops withdrew humiliatingly from Lebanon in April 2005, caving under the force of international condemnation and Lebanese demonstrations, many analysts once more imagined the impending demise of the Syrian regime, which was assumed by most to be at least implicated in the murder of Hariri, and which was expected to be fingered in the UN inquiry set up to investigate it.
Yet, two years later, and after numerous statements of disapproval from practically every European government, in addition to suddenly frosty relations with influential Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the Syrian regime finds itself, once more, being courted by most of its critics. While the Bush administration stubbornly remains entrenched in its attempts to isolate Syria, immaturely refusing to even conduct a dialogue, other countries have recognized that it is impossible to deal with the region’s three foremost problems without Syria’s cooperation. Indeed, in each of Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, Syria has history, influence and long-term interests, and any development in these three countries will involve Syria, one way or another, especially while the Syrian Golan Heights remain occupied by Israel.
Ironically, the US and Israel, Syria’s staunchest opponents, can take the credit for giving back to the Syrian regime the self-confidence it had nearly lost, and the rapprochement with the EU. The Israeli assault on Lebanon in July 2006, which Hezbollah surprisingly managed to counter in what many considered a true victory of Arab resistance against Western aggression and occupation, reaped many benefits for Syria; the regime’s support of Hezbollah (and groups like Hamas) simultaneously vindicated it in the eyes of an Arab street frustrated with Arab and foreign leaders alike, and proved to foreign governments that Syria was an indispensable partner. For the Syrian regime, which had argued this all along, the time had come to settle accounts and demand the leading role it warranted, if only because of geography.
This is why the recent conference on Iraq included Syria, why the upcoming Arab summit will be held in Damascus, why the EU has restarted progress on the Association Agreement, and why Syrian officials are welcoming droves of foreign dignitaries again. This is also why Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi led a delegation of members of Congress to Damascus, in a public rejection of official government policy, to the delight of the Syrians. The only ones still balking are the American and Israeli governments, and Syria’s messages of engagement are falling on deaf ears.
Some analysts have since argued that the Syrian regime is only interested in its own survival (a point which certainly holds merit) and that it would use negotiations with Israel and engagement with others merely as a means to an end – the end being its longevity and security. As long as the Syrian regime is engaged and negotiating, goes the logic, it escapes the pressure of the Hariri investigation and tribunal, amongst others.
There are some flaws in these arguments. For one, it is simplistic to imagine that the Syrian regime would only prefer the status quo to peace with Israel; on the contrary, there is merit to the case that the retrieval of the Golan Heights would give the regime renewed legitimacy, and a popularity which would allow it to ride a wave of acceptance for many years. In fact, this seems to be validated by the very generous concessions the regime seems willing to give just to rekindle the peace process. While this could be purely tactical, given Israel’s public refusal to give back the land it occupied in 1967, the regime is clearly prepared for a scenario of peaceful relations.
It is also simplistic to imagine that the regime is after close ties with the US, when its saving grace, and the source of its credibility in some areas, has actually been its opposition to American designs on the region and its support of Arab causes and resistance movements. Given that Arab populations have mostly been cured of the desire for regime change, thanks to the catastrophic consequences of the Bush administration’s actions in Iraq, the Syrian regime is in no doubt that its forceful removal (by foreign troops or by popular uprising) is not an option - if it ever was.
As for the Hariri investigation and the issue of the tribunal, following an initial period of self-defense, the regime has managed to show it was a victim of unreasonable political persecution after the main witnesses in Detlev Mehlis’s first report were discredited. With subsequent reports being mostly technical and lacking the necessary “smoking gun” to indict Syria, the Syrian regime currently seems out of the fire and in no fear of the investigation anymore.
It is therefore important to make a distinction between the regime’s real intentions and the claims of the US and its allies (for instance, that Syria wants to avoid any fallback from an eventual Hariri tribunal, and that it wants peace talks for the sake of talks rather than for the sake of peace). While it certainly doesn’t like being isolated, it is not really looking to become a US ally; had this been a goal, Syria would need to get a divorce from Iran, abandon the support of resistance groups in the region, and give up its pole position as the beating heart of Arabism. In other words, the Syrian regime would have to renege on most of its Baathist aims (relations with Iran being the least Arabist of all) and acknowledge that the sacrifices imposed on the Syrian people in the name of the conflict with Israel were not, after all, necessary. For the time being, this doesn’t seem to be on the tables. Furthermore, the carrots offered in return for so many concessions are simply not appetizing enough, especially as the regime is not really looking to become one more in a string of “moderate” Arab states bound to the US by treaties.
What the Syrian regime wants is much more simple: it wants to be acknowledged as a force in the region, and as an interested party whose cooperation must be sought. In return for this recognition, and for concerned parties to concede that Syria’s involvement in Lebanese and Palestinian affairs is a given, the regime claims it will help the US make an honorable exit out of Iraq, and continue helping in the “war on terror.”
The isolation strategy has clearly not worked, and the Syrian regime is proving to its many critics that it is the only option in town. Internal opposition in Syria has been completely stifled, and foreign critics have mostly come back bearing gifts. Those who remain reluctant to engage the regime (such as French president Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and of course American President George Bush) will all be long gone, and the Syrian regime will have shown, once more, its propensity for patience. For the time being, it is basking in the limelight it feels it deserves and considering the next possible scenarios when regime change finally happens on its critics' turf.
